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INFORMATION SYSTEMS AUDIT AND CONTROL ISSUES FOR 
ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: SOME QUALITATIVE 
EVIDENCE 
Abstract: 
Today, organisations may have production applications running on multiple servers, 
spread geographically throughout the organization. In such circumstances, 
organisations will look to software assistance through packages collectively known as 
Enterprise Management Systems (EMS).  This paper shows how the introduction of 
such software creates a new set of IS audit and control problems for such 
environments.  Five sites were interviewed and case studied.  While many audit issues 
were identified, the following problems were clearly highlighted in the cases: a lack 
of backup in terms of critical human resources; change controls are often non-
existent; possible malfunction of scripts causing various impacts including loss of 
data integrity; and, pre-emption of the execution of critical production systems 
crippling the entire production environment.  Moreover, while the academic and 
practice literatures were found to be comprehensive regarding the audit and control 
issues peculiar to the EMS environment, the study identified issues that are not 
covered in the literature.  
 
Introduction 
In an Information Systems (IS) audit, an important area of review for the auditor is the 
operations centre (or the production servers room(s)) from which the production 
systems of the organisation are usually run.  A review of the adequacy of the general 
controls in these areas is a well-accepted step in any comprehensive Information 
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Systems (IS) audit, irrespective of whether the production centre is operated by the 
organisation itself or by an outsourcing firm (Weber, 1999; King, 1990).   
Such a review is important to external and internal auditors alike.  External auditors in 
fulfilling their attest objectives would focus on controls being present in the centre 
operations to safeguard assets and ensure data integrity.  For example, adequate fire 
prevention, water detection, and physical security controls would safeguard expensive 
computing assets while controls that monitored the recording of system error 
messages and the restarting of abended (abnormally ended) programs would 
contribute to the maintenance of data integrity.  Internal auditors are not only 
concerned with attest objectives but more usually with efficiency and effectiveness 
objectives.  In relation to the corporate data centre for example, existence of a sound, 
well-balanced production schedule and well-established procedures for restarting 
systems and producing system backups exemplify such controls. 
Traditionally, when reviewing the operations area, auditors have looked for manual 
controls such as separation of duties between operators, production schedulers, 
programmers, data entry operators, network administrators, and the like; effective 
supervision of operator activities; and, rotation of duties amongst operations staff.  
Over the last few years in Australia, computer centres have moved to automated (or 
lights out) operations facilities (AOF) in varying degrees.  Such facilities can range 
from automatic loading and unloading of storage media such as tapes and cartridges 
to the starting and stopping of programs according to a predetermined schedule, 
making backups, responding to system messages, restarting failed systems, etc. 
(Weber, 1999).  Accordingly, human intervention is rarely needed.   Moreover, today, 
it is not unusual for organizations to have their production systems running across 
ten’s, even hundred’s of servers and networks.  In such a complex environment, 
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automated assistance in the monitoring and management of the production 
components would appear necessary and cost-effective (Ayers & Fentress, 2000; 
Kreger, 2001; Driml, 2003).  Today, such monitoring and management systems are 
categorised as Enterprise Management Systems (EMS) 
The usefulness of AOF/EMS operations has been apparent in North American sites 
since the late 80’s (Miller, 1988; King, 1990; Greenstein, 1992; Mullen, 1993; 
Sprague & McNurlin, 1993; Marlin, 1999; Gisinger et al., 2001).  The cost-
effectiveness, and hence the take-up, of technological innovations in Australian sites 
tends to lag its North American counterparts by some five to seven years usually.  
Factors such as proven productivity gains, increased labour award flexibility allowing 
significant labour reductions in the operations area, a significant increase in the 
number of EMS products on the market and a commensurate drop in the cost of EMS 
hardware and software have all combined to bring about a marked increase in the use 
of EMS operations (to varying degrees) in Australian computer centres.  To date, 
however, there does not appear to be any evidence on the degree of pervasion and the 
major products used in Australia. 
Accordingly, this study was performed to gain preliminary insight on the following 
research questions: 
1. What functional capabilities of the EMS are being popularly utilised? 
2. What critical audit issues arise when an organization uses an EMS? 
3. What controls are currently exercised over the EMS? 
4. Is there a critical (significant) difference between the audit issues and controls 
specified in the IS Audit literature and those used/needed in EMS 
environments in practice? 
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This paper describes the results of a qualitative study into these research questions.  
Five (5) large organizations were case studied in terms of their use (to varying 
degrees) of AOF/EMS software for systems management.  We performed this work 
because of three motivations principally: 
1. To inform/extend the literature on the critical audit and control issues that 
may arise when an AOF/EMS is introduced into an organization; 
2. To obtain insight into the types/extent of controls that organisations have 
actually implemented over the use of AOF/EMS systems; and 
3. To provide some guidance to the community of Information Systems 
Audit practitioners on the types of controls that need to be in place for 
AOF/EMS systems, and where the most likely exposures in the control of 
such systems will be found. 
Accordingly, this paper unfolds in the following manner.  The next section explains 
briefly what Enterprise Management Systems are and what functionality they provide 
to an organization.  Then, from a review of the literature, the specific audit issues that 
arise from the use of an EMS and the controls that are suggested to be in place are 
identified.  Next, the case study research methodology and a summary of the results of 
each of the five cases are provided.  The following section discusses the results 
particularly in the context of the research questions set for this work.  Finally, the last 
section summarises the work in this study and explains briefly how further work into 
the area will be progressed. 
What Are Enterprise Management Systems? 
A wide range of enterprise management software (EMS) products is available for 
automating various aspects of the management of an organisation’s information 
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systems. These products may be designed for the mainframe or client/server 
environments, and may represent solutions for specific tasks, e.g., storage 
management, or provide “end-to-end” solutions incorporating the vendor’s own 
specialised products and/or those of other vendors. Examples of specialised products 
are Legato Storage Manager, Axent Software’s OmniGuard™ security management 
software and Seagate’s  Backup Exec™ software management solution. Examples of 
end-to-end solutions are IBM’s Tivoli Management Environment (TME) ® 10, 
Computer Associates’ Unicenter TNG ®, Hewlett-Packard’s OpenView ®, BMC’s 
Patrol ®, Aprisma’s (Cabletron’s) Spectrum ®, Candle Corporation’s MQ Series and 
BullSoft’s EMS package (Ayers & Fentress , 2000). 
Garvey (1999), Hagendorf-Follett (2001), Lais (2000a), Lais (2000b), Middlemiss 
(2000), Saunders (1999), Songini (2000), and Yasin (1999) explain that the key 
capabilities provided by EMS products include: 
• Automatic detection of applications, databases and hardware environment, 
including desktops, network computers, hubs, routers and internet gateways.  
• Graphical presentation of topology, business process views and floor plans.  
• Standardised reporting including system performance metrics.  
• Automating production setup, scheduling, execution and monitoring of processes.  
• Job restart. Job restart systems can analyse why jobs terminate abnormally and 
automate restart and recovery processes.  
• User notification system to provide an alert notification facility that notifies users 
of anomalous events.  
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• Active server-based virus scanning at the point of entry for e-mails and their 
attachments, and the monitoring of shared folders. 
• EMS products can monitor a range of database availability issues, including 
backup server, table spaces, logs, locks, cache, file backup status and transaction 
queues.  
• Operating system management that includes automatic discovery and continuous 
monitoring support for the operating system across a LAN or WAN, monitoring 
key components – CPU, memory, disks, network communications, processes, 
users, disk I/O, and queues. 
• Application management that involves central monitoring and management of 
applications and services for peak performance and availability. Organisations 
spend millions of dollars on enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems like SAP 
R/3, services and infrastructure.  An EMS product can utilise various components 
to monitor the ERP system, execute certain tasks in response to system alerts, and 
deploy the graphical user interface (e.g., SAPGUI) to large numbers of desktops. 
• Automated monitoring and management of internet services for UNIX and 
Windows NT.  
• Job flow and workload management.  
• Network management that includes event, fault, configuration, and performance 
management of networks. This service ensures the LANs run smoothly, with 
minimal network downtime. The EMS monitors and analyses WAN traffic, and 
manages interfaces between local and backbone networks. 
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• EMS products may provide comprehensive security management through 
authentication, access control, encryption, and audit trail analyses across multiple 
platforms. 
• Storage management that includes backup, encryption, compression, version and 
time control, vaulting, and robotics; and 
• Resource accounting and charging based on the tracking of usage of resources by 
user and cost centre, and determine charges.  
Recent developments in EMS’s incorporate predictive analysis modelling capabilities. 
For example, Computer Associates’ Neugents ™ software used in Unicenter TNG 
monitor systems for unusual patterns and behaviour in real time and can analyse 
historical performance data to provide the ability to create a model of a system’s 
patterns and predict future activity. BMC’s Patrol ™ incorporates predictive analysis 
and capacity planning software for advanced modelling and analysis of changes in 
hardware, applications and transaction rates (see for example, Johnston, 2001, and 
Yasin, 2000). 
Internal Control and IS Control. 
The internal control system and its structure for an organisation has been explained by 
many authors.  For example, Arens et al. (1996, p. 329) explain that, “the system 
consists of many specific policies and procedures designed to provide management 
with reasonable assurance that the goals and objectives it believes important to the 
entity will be met.”  The system is operationalised by a set of organisation-specific 
internal controls or control procedures designed to address  internal control objectives 
such as safeguarding assets; compliance with corporate policies and/or legal 
requirements; authorisation, validity, completeness, valuation, classification, timing, 
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and posting of transactions; and, efficiency and effectiveness of operations (Arens et 
al., 1996; CISA Review Manual, 2004).  When an information system is a prominent 
part of an organisation’s internal control environment, Auditing Standard AUS 214 
(.02) and its American equivalent, SAS 94 (20), clearly dictate that the auditor should 
consider how the IS environment affects the audit.  Accordingly, the control 
objectives and control procedures have to be translated into IS-specific control 
objectives and procedures. 
This task has been done comprehensively over the years by the auditing standard 
setters, academic, and practitioner literatures (see for example, AUS 412 (.14); AUS 
402 (.19 (e)); SAS (19); Weber, 1999; Bae et al., 2003; CISA Review Manual, 2004).  
In particular, Weber (1999) and the CISA Review Manual (2004) give good guidance 
on the IS control procedures required in an IS environment.  They categorise them as 
general management controls and application specific controls.  The general 
management controls include controls over general organization and management, 
access to data and programs, systems development methodologies and change control, 
data processing operations, systems programming and technical support, data 
processing quality assurance procedures, physical access, back-up, and recovery 
planning.  The application specific controls look at controls over input, processing, 
output, network communications, and databases for each major application system. 
In particular, in programmed environments, authors such as Weber (1999) and Bae et 
al. (2003) point out that the highly pertinent general controls are separation of duties, 
security over access to the source and object code versions of the programs and their 
parameters, development standards (i.e., programs developed in an authorised 
manner), change control for the programs, back-up and recovery procedures. 
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IS Audit and Control Issues Specific to EMS. 
To date, there does not appear to be any evidence on the general audit and control 
issues introduced by the use of the EMS/AOF systems in Australia. 
Where the extent of human intervention by operators and local network administrators 
has been significantly minimised (or even eliminated) by EMS/AOF operations, the 
nature of the auditor’s general control review of the operations area has necessarily 
changed dramatically.  However, much of the training literature for auditors and 
information systems auditors still refers heavily to controls over human operators 
such as a review of operator manuals and instructions (see for example, CISA Review 
Technical Information Manual 2000, 2002, 2004).  In effect though, by implementing 
EMS/AOF operations, organisations effectively are replacing predominantly human-
controlled environments with programmed environments as the EMS/AOF systems 
consist of hardware controlled by program scripts written using languages specific to 
the products.  Accordingly, the control procedures specific to programmed 
environments, tailored to the characteristics of EMS/AOF systems, become more 
relevant. 
Only little guidance, however, has been provided to auditors to date on the nature and 
extent of the controls needed over EMS/AOF operations.  Weber (1999) and King 
(1990) provide a review of the controls thought to be needed in this area, at least 
according to the prescriptive academic IS audit literature.  These researchers prescribe 
that the important audit issues that need to be investigated, clarified, and detailed are: 
1. Authorisation of the design, implementation, and maintenance of EMS/AOF 
programs (procedures or parameters). 
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2. Separation of duties between the people who write the EMS/AOF procedures and 
those people who install the procedures in the EMS/AOF hardware. 
3. Storage of the EMS/AOF procedures and the security over that storage. 
4. The extent to which the EMS/AOF procedures can interfere with the running of 
production application systems; for example, being able to suppress, not allow to be 
logged, or ignore application system error messages. 
5. Documentation of EMS/AOF procedures. 
6. Back-up and off-site storage of EMS/AOF programs, parameters. 
7. Contingency plans for the failure of EMS/AOF hardware and/or software. 
The Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) qualification offered by the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) is the worldwide pre-
eminent practice qualification for IS auditors. The Certified Information Systems 
Auditor (CISA) review manual (2004, p. 166) identifies briefly some concerns that 
arise in an automated systems management environment.  “These include: 
1. Remote access to a master console is often granted to stand-by operators for 
contingency purposes such as automated software failure.  Therefore, 
communication access is opened to allow for very risky, high-power, console 
commands.  Communication access security must be extensive.  This would 
include using leased lines and dial-back capabilities. 
2. Contingency plans must allow for the proper identification of a disaster in the 
unattended facility.  In addition, the EMS/AOF controlling software or manual 
contingency procedures must be adequately documented and tested at the 
recovery site. 
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3. The application of proper program change controls and access controls, 
because vital IS operations are performed by software systems.  Also, tests of 
software should be performed on a periodic basis especially after changes or 
updates are applied. 
4. Assurance that errors are not hidden by the software and that all errors result 
in operator/network administrator notification.” 
It is interesting to note that items 1-4 in the CISA list are essentially covered in the 
literature.  However, the literature does not directly allude to the CISA audit issue 1.  
We believe that the empirical case studies will uncover other important audit and 
control issues surrounding EMS/AOF operations that have not been identified and 
documented in the literature as yet. The general control issues currently identified in 
the literature are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Control issues currently identified in literature. 
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Case Studies 
As stated earlier, this study was performed to gain preliminary insight on the 
following research questions: 
1. What functional capabilities of the EMS are being popularly utilised? 
2. What critical audit issues arise when an organization uses an EMS? 
3. What controls are currently exercised over the EMS? 
4. Is there a critical (significant) difference between the audit issues and controls 
specified in the IS Audit literature and those used/needed in EMS 
environments in practice? 
In order to obtain data to address these research questions, several large organisations 
that have implemented EMS/AOF were approached and five (5) of them agreed to 
participate in case studies. These case studies were conducted in late 2000/early 2001 
to obtain in-depth knowledge of the issues associated with using EMS that is more 
readily obtained through an interview. Participants in case studies are more likely to 
provide information that would not be made available in response to a survey, and so 
they allow the researcher to obtain a richer understanding of the nature and 
complexity of the phenomena under investigation (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin , 1994).  
 
Research Instrument 
The case study/interview protocol used as the basis for the case study research was 
constructed on the basis of the issues identified in the academic and practice 
literatures1.  The interviewees in the organisations consisted of those Information 
                                                 
1 A copy of the request letter, consent form, and the protocol used by the interviewers can be obtained from the 
corresponding author on request. 
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Services staff who were directly involved in the installation, running, and 
maintenance of the EMS/AOF systems for the organisation.  In order to ensure 
impartiality and completeness of the collection and analysis of data collected in this 
study, a methodology was adapted from Lillis (1999). The interview protocol was 
designed in order to minimise interviewer bias, which can significantly affect the 
results derived from the data. The prescriptive nature of the interview protocol 
ensured that each case was subjected to the same level of questioning. Additionally, 
the interview protocol, and the feedback sought prior to the implementation of the 
interviews, helped ensure that the interview protocol consisted of probing non-
directive questions – further reducing the possibility of bias.  
The protocol was pilot tested at the first case study site (Case Study A). The Case A 
participant (herein referred to as “Participant A”) was provided with a copy of the 
protocol that would be used as the basis for the interview and to document the 
responses. Participant A was asked to provide feedback on the instrument 
instructions, clarity, etc. to reduce potential problems when used for the survey. 
Appropriate modifications on the instrument were made based on this feedback. 
The protocol was structured with two main sections. Section A was intended to collect 
demographic data about the site to provide an understanding of the environment to be 
controlled using the EMS/AOF. The data to be collected included hardware make and 
model, major operating systems used, database products, types of local area networks, 
major application systems (e.g., Oracle Financials, SAP R/3), numbers of 
workstations and on-line users, annual revenue, number of personnel, type of 
industry, private or public sector, and a copy of the organisation chart for the 
information systems group. 
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Section B collected data on the EMS/AOF product(s) used and capabilities 
implemented by the organisation. The data to be collected included EMS/AOF 
product(s), major application systems controlled using the product(s), level of 
privilege afforded to the EMS/AOF (e.g., a high level of privilege would allow the 
EMS/AOF to terminate application systems), capabilities implemented, responsibility 
for and control of input parameter settings and script languages, change controls 
implemented (e.g., authorisation and testing of changes to scripts), backup and 
recovery procedures, and other control issues. 
 
Data Analysis 
The analysis of the interview transcript data utilised a combination of theory-testing 
and grounded theory methodologies. The interview protocol was defined with two 
purposes in mind. First, to confirm the extent to which the control issues that are 
identified in literature feature in organisations utilising EMS/AOF functionality. 
Second, to identify any additional control issues present in practice but not present in 
the current literature, i.e., to derive new control issues from the data. 
The interview transcript data was analysed by one researcher, without the use of data 
analysis packages, in phase one of the analysis. The transcripts were then codified and 
analysed by another researcher using the NUD.IST Vivo 2.0 package in phase two of 
the analysis. The researchers then met to discuss the results of the analysis. The 
approach was seen as a means of reducing any subjectivity that may be present in the 
analysis. 
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Phase One Case Study Results 
Five case studies were conducted involving large organisations known to have 
implemented EMS/AOF. These organisations (herein referred to as Cases A – E) each 
employed at least 2000 personnel, with Case E having approximately 12000 
personnel. Huge investments had been made by these organisations in their IT 
systems; however, they each had only one or two staff responsible for the operation of 
their EMS/AOF. The data gathered from each case study is summarised and discussed 
below2. The results presented immediately below summarise the phase one manual 
analysis of the transcript data.  Each table of results is followed by a set of critical 
comments derived from the interview transcripts that give support to the relevant 
evaluations made in the table. 
Case A 
Hardware/software 
environment: 
Fujitsu with MSPLEX operating 
system 
Database products:  SYMPHOWARE, AIM, MDB 
Major application systems: Rating and billing 
Workstations:  2001-3000 
Demographics 
Industry:  Local government utility 
EMS/AOF Operations 
EMS/AOF products:  Fujitsu AOF 
Batch applications controlled:  Meter readings, billing, cash receipts, credit control, backup EMS Environment 
On-line applications controlled: Rating, property, accounting 
Level of privilege: Very high 
Level of privilege 
and utilised 
capabilities Capabilities used: 
Automatic detection, production 
monitoring, user notification, 
database management, operating 
system management, application 
management, job flow and 
workload management, network 
management, storage management 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts No 
Who maintains input 
parameters: Systems support Separation of 
Duties 
Who maintains scripts:  Systems support, operations support, job schedulers 
Security over Access control for parameters: RACF, ACF2 security software 
                                                 
2 A copy of the typed transcripts of the five case study/interviews can be obtained from the corresponding author 
on request. 
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Scripts/Parameters Access control for scripts: Operating system or third party security software 
Scripts documented: No 
Documentation Recovery Procedures 
documented: Adequate 
Backups Backup for scripts: With regular system backup 
Recovery procedures: With system recovery procedures Contingency Plans Testing of recovery procedures: No 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Change controls: 
Changes made in production 
environment using GEM change 
management software. 
Independent review of changes 
with limited testing.  
 
Comments 
Security over the input parameters and scripts was strong with the use of third–party 
security packages to control access to the libraries that held these critical components. 
The AOF product controls a range of applications in the production environment. 
Accordingly, there is no development environment in which to perform changes and 
testing. AOF operates at a very high level of privilege. In addition to monitoring the 
systems and providing alerts, AOF can perform automated functions that may include 
executing programs and terminating application systems. Accordingly, there is a risk 
that scripts may malfunction and cause various impacts including loss of data 
integrity. Few staff members have the expertise to manage this product properly. 
There is also the potential for maliciousness by staff. 
Case B 
Hardware/software 
environment: 
Compaq Alpha with UNIX and 
VMS operating system 
Database products:  ORACLE 
Major application systems: ORACLE Financials, CONCEPT Payroll 
Workstations:  > 4000 
Demographics 
Industry:  Tertiary institution 
EMS/AOF Operations 
EMS/AOF products:  BMC Patrol, Networker, Legato Storage Manager, SMS 
Batch applications controlled:  Payroll EMS Environment 
On-line applications controlled: Finance, personnel 
Level of privilege Level of privilege: Very high 
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and utilised 
capabilities 
Capabilities used: 
Automatic detection, graphical 
presentation, standardised 
reporting, user notification, 
database management, operating 
system management, internet 
monitoring 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts No 
Who maintains input 
parameters: Systems specialist Separation of Duties 
Who maintains scripts:  Systems specialist 
Access control for parameters: Operating system Security over 
Scripts/Parameters Access control for scripts: Operating system or third party security software 
Scripts documented: No 
Documentation Recovery Procedures 
documented: No 
Backups Backup for scripts: With regular system backup 
Recovery procedures: With system recovery procedures Contingency Plans Testing of recovery procedures: Yes 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Change controls: None 
 
Comments 
This organization is at an early stage in implementing BMC Patrol, but it intends 
using this product to control all application systems. Strong security over the input 
parameters and scripts is maintained by the file permission settings of the operating 
system. Change controls are non-existent however. Accordingly, there is no 
development environment in which to perform changes and testing. This product 
operates at a very high level of privilege and can perform automated functions that 
may include executing programs and terminating application systems. Accordingly, 
there is a risk that scripts may malfunction and cause various impacts including loss 
of data integrity. Few staff members have the expertise to manage this product 
properly. Additional control issues raised by staff include remote control of 
workstations by systems personnel and “piggybacking” on user ORACLE Financials 
sessions via the Software Management System (SMS). 
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Case C 
Hardware/software 
environment: HP with HP UX operating system 
Database products:  ORACLE 
Major application systems: 
Inhouse applications, HR, 
Network Facilities Management, 
Roster Status 
Workstations:  2001-3000 
Demographics 
Industry:  Energy utility 
EMS/AOF Operations 
EMS/AOF products:  BMC Patrol 
Batch applications controlled:  Nil EMS Environment 
On-line applications controlled: All applications, including database operations 
Level of privilege: Only monitoring 
Level of privilege 
and utilised 
capabilities Capabilities used: 
Automatic detection, standardised 
reporting, 
database management, operating 
system management 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts No 
Who maintains input 
parameters: Database administrator Separation of Duties 
Who maintains scripts:  Database administrator 
Access control for parameters: Operating system Security over 
Scripts/Parameters Access control for scripts: Operating system 
Scripts documented: No 
Documentation Recovery Procedures 
documented: No 
Backups Backup for scripts: With regular system backup 
Recovery procedures: None Contingency Plans Testing of recovery procedures: No 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Change controls: None 
 
Comments 
This organization suffers from a lack of management commitment to implementing 
BMC Patrol. Hewlett Packard (HP) provides standard scripts. Strong security over the 
input parameters and scripts is maintained by the file permission settings of the 
operating system. Change controls are non-existent. Accordingly, there is no 
development environment in which to perform changes and testing. This product can 
operate at a very high level of privilege, but is currently used only for monitoring. 
Despite this, the risk remains that scripts may malfunction and cause various impacts 
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including loss of data integrity. Few staff members have the expertise to manage this 
product properly.  
Case D 
Hardware/software 
environment: 
Sun, Alpha, Compaq, HP with 
Sun OS, UNIX and HP UX 
operating systems 
Database products:  ORACLE 
Major application systems: ORACLE Financials 
Workstations:  > 4000 
Demographics 
Industry:  Local government 
EMS/AOF Operations 
EMS/AOF products:  
CA Uni-Center, BMC Patrol, 
Control M, Datametrics, 
ViewPoint 
Batch applications controlled:  Revenue 
EMS Environment 
On-line applications controlled: ORACLE 
Level of privilege: Only monitoring 
Level of privilege 
and utilised 
capabilities Capabilities used: 
Automatic detection,  graphical 
presentation, standardised 
reporting, production monitoring, 
user notification, database 
management, operating system 
management, internet monitoring, 
job flow and workload 
management, storage management 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts No 
Who maintains input 
parameters: 
Desktop support, operations 
manager Separation of 
Duties 
Who maintains scripts:  Desktop support, operations manager 
Access control for parameters: Operating system Security over 
Scripts/Parameters Access control for scripts: Database management system 
Scripts documented: Yes 
Documentation Recovery Procedures 
documented: No 
Backups Backup for scripts: Separate backup 
Recovery procedures: Separate recovery Contingency Plans Testing of recovery procedures: No 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Change controls: 
Authorisation, separate 
development environment, unit 
testing, some changes in 
production  
 
Comments 
Strong security over the input parameters is maintained by the file permission settings 
of the operating system while security over the scripts is maintained through the 
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access controls of the database management system. Separate development, testing, 
and production libraries are maintained for the maintenance of the EMS/AOF scripts.  
Accordingly, change controls are deemed to be adequate. These products are currently 
used only for monitoring applications.  
Case E 
Hardware/software 
environment: 
Fujitsu, HP with BME and HP UX 
operating systems 
Database products:  INGRIS 
Major application systems: POLARIS 
Workstations:  > 4000 
Demographics 
Industry:  State government 
EMS/AOF Operations 
EMS/AOF products:  ITO, Vigilant, HP Operations Centre, Maestro, Helmsman 
Batch applications controlled:  None EMS Environment 
On-line applications controlled: POLARIS, property, weapons 
Level of privilege: Only monitoring 
Level of privilege 
and utilised 
capabilities Capabilities used: 
Automatic detection,  graphical 
presentation, production 
monitoring, database 
management, operating system 
management, job flow and 
workload management, network 
management 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts No 
Who maintains input 
parameters: Systems administration Separation of Duties 
Who maintains scripts:  Systems administration 
Access control for parameters: Operating system Security over 
Scripts/Parameters Access control for scripts: Operating system 
Scripts documented: No 
Documentation Recovery Procedures 
documented: Yes 
Backups Backup for scripts: With regular system backup 
Recovery procedures: None Contingency Plans Testing of recovery procedures: No 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Change controls: 
Authorisation, separate 
development environment, unit 
testing, some changes in 
production, independent testing, 
some documentation 
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Comments 
Strong security over the input parameters and scripts is maintained by the file 
permission settings of the operating system. Change controls exist but they could be 
improved by not allowing changes to be made directly to “production” scripts. There 
is no disaster management plan for IT. These products are currently used only for 
monitoring applications. Without full testing, malfunctions could occur resulting in 
lost data integrity.  
 
Phase Two Analysis Results 
The case study interview transcripts were coded and analysed using NUD.IST Vivo 
2.0 software for textual data analysis. The NVivo package has been long regarded as 
one of the leading qualitative data analysis packages (Lewis 1998). The package was 
chosen for its powerful data codification and data searching capabilities.  
Raw interview transcripts were coded with the use of NVivo, associating transcript 
sentences with nodes. In order to reduce bias in the analysis of the data, the 
hierarchical coding structure was designed based on the semi-structured interview 
questions. Any additional nodes in the hierarchy that did not correspond to the initial 
coding structure were added as additional issues emerging from the interview data. 
The results of the NVivo analysis are presented in Table 1.  
Issue 
Number of cases (out of 
five possible) in which the 
issue was raised 
Level of Privilege  
High 2 
Monitoring Only 3 
Utilised capability  
Automatic detection  5 
Graphical presentation  3 
Level of privilege 
and utilised 
capabilities 
Standardised reporting 4 
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Production monitoring 2 
Standardised text editor 0 
Job restart 0 
User notification system 3 
Virus scanning 0 
Database management 5 
Operating system management 5 
Application management 1 
Internet monitoring 2 
Job flow and workload 
management 
2 
Network management 1 
Security management 0 
Storage management 2 
Output management 0 
Resource accounting and charging 0 
Authorisation Standards applied to scripts 0 
Access control for scripts  
Operating System 3  
Third party security software 1 
Database Management System 1 
Access control for parameters  
Operating System 4 
Security over 
Scripts/Parameters
Third party security software  
Scripts documented 1 Documentation Recovery Procedures documented 2 
Who maintains input parameters:  
Systems Administrator 2 
Database Administrator 1 
Systems Specialist 1 
Operational Support 2 
Who maintains scripts:   
Systems Administrator 2 
Database Administrator 1 
Systems Specialist 1 
Separation of 
Duties 
Operational Support 1 
Change controls  
Authorisation 2 
Separate development 
environment 
2 
Unit testing 2 
Independent testing 1 
Updating script documentation 1 
Comprehensive 
Program Change 
Controls 
Controlled release to production 1 
Backup procedures  
Regular system backups 4 
Separate backups 1 Backups 
Documented 2 
Recovery procedures  
System recovery procedures 2 
Separate recovery procedures 1 
None 2 
Contingency Plans 
Tested periodically 1 
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Other issues 
raised: 
lack of expertise of staff in the products in question (3 cases),  
lack of experienced backup staff (2 cases),  
lack of confidence in the products’ system performance metrics 
reporting (1 case),  
product not utilized to best of monitoring capabilities (1 case),  
remote access to master console (1 case) 
Table 1. Summary of Nvivo case analysis. 
The results from phase one and phase two analyses of the case studies can be 
summarised as follows.  
• There appears to be a strong priority on  security over the input parameters and 
scripts. These components are maintained by a handful of persons with the 
required expertise.  
• However, there is a lack of backup in terms of human resources.  
• Change controls range from existing and operating properly, to existing and 
not operating properly, to non-existent. Change controls that exist but do not 
operate properly are characterised by many changes being performed in 
“production” without adequate testing and documentation.  
• A separate development environment may not be maintained in many 
instances.  
• In addition to monitoring the systems and providing alerts, these products can 
perform automated functions that may include executing programs and 
terminating application systems. Accordingly, there is a risk that scripts may 
malfunction and cause various impacts including loss of data integrity. 
• This software needs to operate at such a high level of privilege with regard to 
the Operating System that, in some circumstances, it may pre-empt the 
execution of critical production systems and, effectively, cripple the entire 
production environment.  In such circumstances, the entire system may need 
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to be re-started.  Accordingly, recovery procedures and, in extreme situations 
of prolonged outage, disaster recovery procedures become critical. 
It is interesting to review these results in light of the audit issues prescribed by the 
academic and practice literatures earlier.  Table 2 summarises the results in light of 
these issues. 
Audit Issue Mentioned in Cases* 
Addressed 
Adequately 
(On average across 
the 5 cases)** 
1. Authorisation of design, 
implementation and maintenance 
  
1.1. Authorisation Y L 
1.2. Standards N - 
1.3. Ongoing monitoring & 
maintenance of scripts Y H 
2. Separation of Duties Y L 
3. Security over parameters/scripts Y H 
3.1 Security over scripts Y H 
3.2 Security over parameters Y H 
3.3 Control over remote access to 
master console Y L 
4. Documentation Y L 
5. Backups Y H 
6. Contingency plans   
6.1 Recovery Procedures Y M 
6.2 Off site copies N - 
7. Proper program change control   
7.1 Change controls Y L 
7.2 Errors not hidden by software N - 
Other audit issues identified in cases. 
9. Level of privilege of software 
operation 
Y L 
10. Adequate level of expertise in Y M 
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software 
11. Adequate level of backup for human 
 resources. 
Y L 
Table 2. Summary of results against prescribed controls. 
(* Y = Yes, N = No; ** L = 1-2 cases, M = 3 cases, H = 4-5 cases) 
 
Table 2 shows that the prescriptive IS Audit academic and practitioner literatures are 
deficient still with regard to critical issues such as the level of operating system 
privilege at which this type of software operates, the presence of an adequate level of 
expertise in the software at the site, and the presence of an adequate level of backup 
for the critical human experts in this type of software.  Moreover, even though sites 
are aware of many of the critical audit issues prescribed in the literature, they appear 
to pay no/little attention (on average) to several of these issues, e.g., authorisation of 
the development/maintenance of scripts, separation of duties, remote access to master 
consoles, documentation of scripts and design decisions, and change controls.  
Furthermore, there were control issues of which the participants made no mention at 
all, viz., developing scripts according to authorised standards, maintenance of current 
off-site copies of scripts, and ensuring errors are not hidden by the executing scripts.  
Indeed, only secure file storage of the parameters/scripts, and ongoing monitoring 
over the adequacy and completeness of EMS/AOF operations appear to attract high 
levels of attention at sites. 
Summary and Further Work 
This paper has detailed the work performed in a preliminary study that has 
investigated the IS audit and control issues surrounding the introduction and use of an 
Enterprise Management System (Automated Operation Facilities) into a computer-
based site.  It has explained how, today, organisations may have production 
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applications running on tens, even hundreds of servers and networks, spread 
geographically throughout the organization.  In such an environment, organisations 
cannot rely entirely on human operators/administrators.  Moreover, the organization 
needs centralised control over the operation of those corporate servers.  In such 
circumstances, organisations will look to software assistance through packages 
collectively known as Enterprise Management Systems (EMS). 
This paper goes on to show how the introduction of such software, and the resultant 
minimisation of reliance on human operators/administrators, creates a new set of IS 
audit and control problems for such environments.  Five sites were interviewed and 
case studied.  The results of this work are summarised in this study.  While many 
audit issues were identified, the following problems were clearly highlighted in the 
cases: 
• There is adequate security over input parameters and scripts. These are 
maintained by a handful of persons with the required expertise.  
• However, there is a lack of backup in terms of human resources.  
• Change controls range from adequate to non-existent. Many changes are 
performed in production without adequate testing and documentation.  
• A separate development environment may not be maintained.  
• In addition to monitoring the systems and providing alerts, these products can 
perform automated functions that may include executing programs and 
terminating application systems. Accordingly, there is a risk that scripts may 
malfunction and cause various impacts including loss of data integrity. 
• This software needs to operate at such a high level of privilege with regard to 
the Operating System that, in some circumstances, it may pre-empt the 
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execution of critical production systems and, effectively, cripple the entire 
production environment.  In such circumstances, the entire system may need 
to be re-started. 
This paper then determined that while the academic and practice literatures were 
beginning to recognise the audit and control issues peculiar to the EMS/AOF 
environment, there were still issues that the literatures did not cover, viz., the level of 
operating system privilege at which this type of software operates, the presence of an 
adequate level of expertise in the software at the site, and the presence of an adequate 
level of backup for the critical human experts in this type of software.  Moreover, 
even though sites are aware of many of the critical audit issues prescribed in the 
literature, they appear to pay little attention (on average) to several of these issues.  
Indeed, only secure file storage of the parameters/scripts and ongoing monitoring over 
the adequacy and completeness of EMS/AOF operations appear to attract high levels 
of attention at sites. 
The work in this study was designed to accomplish three objectives: 
1. Inform/extend the literature on the critical audit and control issues that 
may arise when an AOF/EMS is introduced into an organization; 
2. Obtain insight into the types/extent of controls that organisations have 
actually implemented over the use of AOF/EMS systems; and 
3. Provide some guidance to the community of Information Systems Audit 
practitioners on the types of controls that need to be in place for 
AOF/EMS systems, and where the most likely exposures in the control of 
such systems will be found. 
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Further work in this area is planned.   On the basis of the results of the qualitative 
work reported here, a comprehensive survey instrument has been designed.  It will be 
issued to in excess of 1,000 large sites in Australia and New Zealand.  The results of 
this study and the subsequent comprehensive survey will attempt to give significant 
insight into the following research questions of interest: 
1. To what extent are EMS’s implemented in large organisations in 
Australia? 
2. What functional capabilities of the EMS are being most popularly utilised? 
3. What critical audit issues arise when an organization uses an EMS? 
4. What controls should be exercised and what controls are currently 
exercised over the EMS? 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work is funded in part by a grant from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia. The authors are indebted to participants and the discussant on an earlier 
version of this paper presented at AFAANZ 2003 in Brisbane. 
 29
REFERENCES 
Arens, A., Best, P., Shailer, G., and J. Loebbecke, 1996, Auditing in Australia: An 
Integrated Approach, 3rd edn., Prentice-Hall:Sydney. 
Ayers, S. and D. Fentress, 2000, “Enhancing IT Governance Through Enterprise 
Management Software Solutions”, Information Systems Control Journal, Vol. 
2, pp. 1-5. 
Bae, B., Epps, R., and S. Gwathmey, 2003, “Internal Control Issues: The Case of 
Changes to Information Processes”, Information Systems Control Journal, 
Vol. 4, pp. 44-46. 
Certified Information Systems Auditor Review Manual, 2000, Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA): Rolling Meadows. 
Certified Information Systems Auditor Review Manual, 2002, Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA): Rolling Meadows. 
Certified Information Systems Auditor Review Manual, 2004, Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA): Rolling Meadows. 
Driml, S., 2003, “Enhancing Security with an IT Network Awareness Center”, 
Information Systems Control Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 51-52. 
Garvey, M., 1999, “Storage Gains Flexibility”, Informationweek, No. 754, p. 30. 
Gisinger, A., Shankaran, R. and P. Ray, 2001, “An evaluation process for enterprise 
management systems: a business perspective”, Proceedings of 2001 Enterprise 
Networking, Applications, and Services Conference, pp. 9-16. 
Greenstein, I., 1992, “Quit babysitting your LANs”, Networking Management, No. 3, 
pp. 70-75. 
 30
Hagendorf-Follett, J., 2001, “Serving the Enterprise”, Computer Reseller News, No. 
928, p. 100. 
Johnston, M., 2001, “IBM Systems Management Software Predicts Server Failure”, 
InfoWorld, Vol 23, No. 5, p. 20. 
King, J., 1990, “Auditing the lights-out facility”, EDPACS, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 1-8. 
Kreger, H., 2001, “Java Management Extensions for Application management”, IBM 
Systems Journal, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 104-129. 
Lais, S., 2000a, “BMC’s Patrol Targets B2B Management”, Computerworld, Vol. 34, 
No. 33, p. 52. 
Lais, S., 2000b, “HP Launches OpenView Suite that offers Business View”, 
Computerworld, Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 10. 
Lewis, R.,  1998,  ATLAS/ti and NUD*IST: A comparative review of two leading 
qualitative data analysis packages.  Cultural Anthropology Methods, 10(3): 
41-47.  
Lillis, A.M., 1999, “A framework for the analysis of interview data from multiple 
field research sites”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 79-105. 
Marlin, S., 1999, “Enterprise Systems Management: Banks look to get a grip on IT”, 
Bank Systems & Technology, Vol. 36, No. 11, pp. 42-48. 
Middlemiss, J., 2000, “ABN AMRO taps Computer Associates’ Platform to 
Consolidate Disparate Systems”, Bank Systems & Technology, Vol. 37, No. 9, 
p. 24. 
Miller, H.W., 1988, “Planning for unattended data center operation”, Mainframe 
Journal, Jan/Feb., pp. 10-15. 
 31
Mullen, J., 1993, “Auditing the Data Center: Setting audit test objectives”, EDP 
Auditing, Auerbach Publications, pp. 1-15. 
Saunders, J., ,1999, “CA adds Storage Control to its Management Tools”, Computing 
Canada, Vol. 25, No. 28, p. 23. 
Songini, M., 2000, “CA targets Quality of Service, Service-Level Management”, 
Network World, Vol. 17, No. 14, p. 10. 
Sprague, R. and B. McNurlin, 1993, Information Systems Management in Practice, 
Prentice-Hall:Englewood-Cliffs. 
Weber, R., 1999, EDP Auditing: Conceptual Foundation and Practice, 3rd edn., 
Prentice-Hall:New Jersey. 
Yasin, R., 1999, “BullSoft combines Security, Management”, Internetweek, No. 766, 
p. 8. 
Yasin, R., 2000, “Anticipate Problems, Map Changes – Software that Sees the 
Future”, Internetweek, No. 827, p. 1. 
Yin, R.K., 1994, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage:Thousand Oaks. 
